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Resumo
As redes tradicionais comec¸am a na˜o ter o dinamismo necessa´rio para
acompanhar a evoluc¸a˜o que os servic¸os on-line teˆm vindo a ter nos u´ltimos
anos. Como forma de contornar este problema, foi proposto recentemente um
novo paradigma de redes: Software Defined Networking (SDN). Enquanto
nas redes tradicionais o plano de controlo se encontra junto do plano de dados,
isto e´, o equipamento de rede e´ responsa´vel na˜o so´ por encaminhar pacotes
(plano de dados), mas tambe´m por decidir como encaminhar o tra´fego (plano
de controlo), em SDN estas duas camadas sa˜o separadas. Em SDN e´ utilizado
um controlador logicamente centralizado para controlar toda a rede. Com
esta separac¸a˜o, uma SDN traz va´rios benef´ıcios que esta˜o relacionados com a
programabilidade introduzida pelo controlador e com a visa˜o geral que este
possui de toda a rede.
Para se poder beneficiar deste novo paradigma, e´ necessa´rio que exista
um plano de migrac¸a˜o dos va´rios tipos de redes existentes. Na arquitetura
SDN, como o plano de controlo e´ implementado num controlador logica-
mente centralizado, e´ necessa´rio que este comunique com os equipamentos
do plano de dados atrave´s de uma interface standard que abstraia os detal-
hes de implementac¸a˜o espec´ıficos do hardware dos equipamentos. Para as
redes de comutac¸a˜o de pacotes o protocolo OpenFlow fornece essa interface
standard para o hardware, facilitando a sua migrac¸a˜o. No caso das redes
o´pticas a passagem para o paradigma SDN na˜o sera´ simples devido ao facto
dos equipamentos o´pticos suportarem diferentes protocolos de comunicac¸a˜o
e na˜o existirem interfaces standard SDN preparadas para o seu suporte.
Para os provedores de servic¸os de telecomunicac¸o˜es, esta evoluc¸a˜o e´ um
desafio, pois requer o desenvolvimento de toda a infraestrutura para con-
trolar e gerir os equipamentos o´pticos. Para estes o ideal seria manter a
gesta˜o e o controlo do lado dos fornecedores de equipamentos o´pticos, e gerir
e controlar os equipamentos o´pticos de diferentes fornecedores (redes o´pticas
multidomı´nio) de uma forma unificada. Desta forma, va´rios provedores de
servic¸os: China Mobile, China Telecom, Verizon e organizac¸o˜es da indu´stria
como o Open Networking Foundation (ONF) propuseram a criac¸a˜o de uma
camada de abstrac¸a˜o entre o controlador dos provedores de servic¸os e os
equipamentos o´pticos. Essa camada de abstrac¸a˜o sera´ responsa´vel por con-
verter a linguagem dos equipamentos o´pticos numa Application Programming
Interface (API) standard SDN para comunicac¸a˜o com o controlador princi-
pal. Cada vendedor de equipamentos o´pticos sera´ responsa´vel por fornecer
os equipamentos o´pticos e a respetiva camada de abstrac¸a˜o. Podemos con-
siderar esta camada de abstrac¸a˜o como sendo um controlador de equipa-
v
mentos o´pticos: o controlador Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM).
Desta forma, os provedores de servic¸os apenas tera˜o de arranjar um contro-
lador localizado na camada superior da hierarquia que seria responsa´vel por
orquestrar toda rede, utilizando para isso a abstrac¸a˜o fornecida pelos contro-
ladores de equipamentos o´pticos. E´ de notar que o controlo e a gesta˜o dos
equipamentos o´pticos na˜o e´ feita diretamente pelo controlador dos provedores
de servic¸os, mas sim na camada de abstrac¸a˜o abaixo, ou seja, pelos contro-
ladores de equipamentos o´pticos. Com esta abordagem, os provedores de
servic¸os ficam sem o controlo completo do sistema, pois ficam dependentes
das operac¸o˜es e da informac¸a˜o que e´ dada pelos controladores de equipa-
mentos o´pticos, como por exemplo informac¸a˜o de desempenho dos servic¸os,
alarmes ou estados da rede o´ptica. Neste contexto, como podera˜o os fornece-
dores de equipamentos o´pticos dar garantias de seguranc¸a aos provedores de
servic¸os? Se a disponibilidade ou a integridade do controlador dos equipa-
mentos o´pticos for comprometida, podera´ haver negac¸a˜o de servic¸o (o con-
trolador de equipamentos o´pticos deixaria de processar informac¸o˜es impor-
tantes da rede o´ptica, como por exemplo alarmes) ou quebras de tra´fego
(desativac¸a˜o de servic¸os o´pticos), o que seria indeseja´vel e poderia trazer
avultados preju´ızos para os provedores de servic¸os. Nesta tese a principal
motivac¸a˜o e´ de facto garantir que o controlador de equipamentos o´pticos
mante´m a sua disponibilidade e integridade no processamento de todos os
pedidos.
O objetivo deste trabalho e´ assim desenvolver uma soluc¸a˜o que proteja
os controladores de equipamentos o´pticos de eventuais ataques de negac¸a˜o
de servic¸o. E´ de notar que mesmo havendo protecc¸a˜o nos links o´pticos, um
utilizador malicioso podera´ colocar o controlador de equipamentos o´pticos
indispon´ıvel, bloqueando assim o acesso a` rede o´ptica por parte do provedor
de servic¸os (se houver problemas na rede o´ptica, estes na˜o sera˜o detetados). A
soluc¸a˜o que propomos para este problema e´ a implementac¸a˜o de mecanismos
de monitorizac¸a˜o e ana´lise dos pedidos ao controlador de modo a controlar
o fluxo de dados a` entrada do controlador de equipamentos o´pticos e assim
garantir a sua disponibilidade. Esta protecc¸a˜o sera´ feita atrave´s da utilizac¸a˜o
de uma reverse proxy e de uma firewall. Para ale´m destes dois mecanismos
de protecc¸a˜o, a comunicac¸a˜o entre o controlador do provedor de servic¸os e
o controlador de equipamentos o´pticos e´ feita de forma segura, de modo a
garantir a integridade de todos os pedidos.
Palavras chave: Software defined networking, equipamentos o´pticos, prove-
dores de servic¸os, controladores de equipamentos o´pticos, seguranc¸a, moni-
torizac¸a˜o, disponibilidade, integridade.
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Abstract
Legacy networks do not have the necessary dynamism to follow the evo-
lution online services have experienced in the past few years. In order to
overcome this problem, the Software Defined Networking (SDN) paradigm
was proposed. The goal of this paradigm is change the way networks are
controlled. In legacy networks, the control plane and the data plane are cou-
pled together in the network elements. SDN separates the control plane and
the data plane through the use of a standard SDN Application Programming
Interface (API) in the data plane to communicate with the logically central-
ized control plane. In order to reap the benefits of SDN, a plan of migration
for legacy networks should be established. For optical networks the migra-
tion to SDN is not easy because optical equipments have their own protocols
to communicate and there are no SDN standardized interfaces prepared to
abstract these type of equipments. In order to solve this problem, organiza-
tions such as China Mobile, China Telecom, Verizon and industry organiza-
tions like the Open Networking Foundation (ONF) have proposed the use of
an abstraction layer between the data plane and the main controller. This
abstraction layer is responsible to convert the optical equipment protocols
into a standard SDN Application Programming Interface (API) to commu-
nicate with the main controller. The abstraction layer can be considered an
optical equipment controller, the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)
controller. With this approach, service providers (SP) (i.e., telecommunica-
tion operators) only need to have a main controller to orchestrate the whole
network through the use of OEM controllers. With this solution the Service
Providers (SP) are able to control the optical network with different optical
equipment from multiple vendors (multi-domain networks).
The OEM controllers are responsible to execute all the operations in the
Network Element (NE) (the NE is the optical equipment) that constitutes
the Data Plane (DP). They also process information that comes from the
NE and translate that information to the main controller. Examples include:
network information and performance of services. The challenge is that if the
OEM controller is compromised, the entire optical network is compromised.
This is the main motivation for this project.
The objective of our work is to develop a solution that can help the Service
Provider (SP) to have confidence in the NEs and respective optical network
connections. To achieve this goal, the system has to guarantee the availability
of the OEM controller. The integrity of the communication between the SP
orchestrator and the OEM controller should also be guaranteed. The OEM
controller should be always available to process notifications, be it from the
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NEs or from the main controller. It should also be ensured that the integrity
of all requests that are sent by the SP controller to the OEM controllers is
guaranteed.
In order to solve these problems, we propose a new security mechanism
for the OEM controller to protect the optical network. The solution consists
in the use of a reverse proxy and a firewall to control the flow of requests to
the OEM controller. The communication between the SP controller and the
OEM controller is also made secure to assure the integrity of requests.
Key words: Software defined networking, optical network equipment, ser-
vice providers, OEM controllers, security, monitoring, availability, integrity,
Network Elements.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Legacy optical networks
The society depends on information access. Today, most things are con-
nected, and information is accessible from almost anywhere. That brings
new challenges to network management and control. To cope, networks need
to be more dynamic and allow better and efficient control. Most networks
are managed and controlled by Service Providers (SP) or carriers. These
networks are used to provide a variety of services to their costumers [21].
Delivering these services requires guarantees of high throughput from the
network, and for that reason optical networks now form the core of SP net-
works.
Optical networks use optical fibers, whose characteristics provide more
bandwidth than copper cables and make them less susceptible to various
kinds of electromagnetic interferences [21]. These networks are composed of
optical equipments that are deployed in Network Elements (NE)s. Each
NE consists in a group of shelfs where the optical cards are placed and
interconnected. An example of an NE can be seen in Figure 1.1. In this
figure it is possible to see a shelf with several cards and the optical ports of
each card used to connect the fibers. NE equipment is sold by optical vendors.
A SP typically uses optical equipment from multiple vendors (multivendor
networks).
In Figure 1.2 we illustrate how a large terrestrial network is segmented.
The SP telecommunication network is typically organized into metropolitan
(metro) areas. Each of these areas are interconnected by the core network
using optical fibers [8].
In optical networks, each NE is managed individually through the use of
vendor-specific interfaces, and that requires highly skilled personnel to make
1
Figure 1.1: Network Element.
the proper configurations. This creates an increase in operational costs,
since the provisioning and management of large multivendor networks be-
came extremely expensive [25]. However, the income for operations has been
decreasing over the last years. As such, the SP has interest in solutions that
can merge optical network management and provisioning across multivendor
networks in order to reduce costs, simplify management, improve provision-
ing time and improve resource utilization [11]. Also, the vertical integration
of these networks (the control plane and data plane are coupled together
inside the network devices), reduces the flexibility, innovation and evolution
of the network infrastructure [15]. A new networking paradigm that tries to
solve the previous problems is Software Defined Networking (SDN).
1.1.1 Legacy optical networks versus SDN
The main difference between traditional or legacy optical networks and SDN
can be seen in figure 1.3. Networks are composed by a Management Plane
(MP), a Control Plane (CP) and a Data Plane (DP). The MP corresponds to
the function applications that are responsible to implement network manage-
ment and operations logic [15]. In optical networks this plane is responsible
to manage the optical equipment through the use of a Network Manage-
ment System (NMS) or Element Management System (EMS). The CP is the
component that defines how traffic is handled. Finally, the DP corresponds
2
Figure 1.2: Terrestrial network layer and segmentation. Figure from [8]
to the place where the optical devices are interconnected. In legacy optical
networks, the CP and DP are coupled together inside the network equipment.
SDN decouples the CP and the DP. For this purpose it uses a well de-
fined southbound interface to communicate with the NEs in the DP. The
communication is done through the use of a standard Application Program-
ming Interface (API), such as OpenFlow [15]. With this separation, the CP
can be seen as the network brain of the SDN architecture. This separation
brings several advantages over legacy optical networks [15]: First, the pro-
grammability of applications is simplified since it provides an abstraction
layer (the CP). Second, the logically centralized CP gives a global view of
the network, which can be used to make effective and consistent decisions
in the network. Third, applications are able to take actions from any part
of the network (this includes automatic reconfigurations when necessary).
Fourth, the integration of more devices in the network is simplified and more
straightforward. All these advantages are very important to improve optical
3
Figure 1.3: Legacy optical networks vs SDN
network management and control, specially in multivendor scenarios.
1.1.2 Migration of legacy optical networks to SDN
In order to benefit from the SDN architecture, an effective migration plan
from legacy optical networks is necessary. In SDN, the control plane is imple-
mented in a logically centralized 1 controller that communicates with the data
plane through the use of a standardized interface that abstracts hardware-
specific implementation details. OpenFlow is the protocol that provides a
standardized interface to packet based networks. Unfortunately, it does not
yet provide the same mechanisms for optical networks. The migration of
optical networks to SDN is not simple [11] because in these networks the
NEs have their own protocols to communicate and there are no standard-
ized interfaces prepared to abstract different optical equipment. In order to
benefit from the SDN capabilities in optical networks, some improvements
are further needed to achieve the necessary flexibility at the photonics and
electrical layers [19].
As stated above, optical networks can be managed through the use of a
NMS or an EMS. These two management interfaces belong to the manage-
ment plane. The EMS is used to manage each NE individually. The NMS
is an application that is used to manage the optical network from a specific
1By logically centralized we mean the automation can be implemented as a distributed
system [14]
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optical vendor. Each optical vendor use a different NMS that is adapted to
their optical equipment. In the NMS, the management requires network op-
erators to design circuits (the configurations in the optical equipment should
match with the hardware) and consequently drive the configuration of NEs.
Another requirement that need to be fulfilled by a migration plan is, for
the service providers, the optical network to be resilient in order to ensure the
desired level of survivability, to fulfill the Service Level Agreement (SLA) [8].
Normally the service availability is defined within this SLA, and that means
for example that an availability value of 99.999% can tolerate an outage of 5
min per year. In order to achieve this, the SPs have to use protection links
in the optical layer and recovery mechanisms.
Optical resilience can be divided to two main fields: multilayer resilience
and multi-domain resilience [8]. Multilayer resilience is illustrated in Figure
1.4. The idea is to take the advantage of recovery options on different tech-
nology layers that compose the Open System Interconnection (OSI) model.
In this figure, the NEs compose the optical layer and all traffic will flow on
this layer (it represents the layer 1 of OSI model). In the upper layers, ap-
pear the Client layers of the optical layer. This means if one link fails in the
optical layer, for instance, the services that are running in client layer will be
notified and then will change to an available connection in the optical layer.
For example, if the link four in the Figure fails, the connection between B
and C will change to B-E-C.
Figure 1.4: Example of Multilayer Resilience
Several improvements have been implemented to make these (multilayer)
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networks more autonomous. Several operators have adopted the Automati-
cally Switched Optical Network (ASON) architecture using the Generalized
Multi Protocol Label Switching (GMPLS) [17] protocol as their optical trans-
port control plane. The GMPLS has been standardized [17] to facilitate the
automated control of multilayer networks. For this purpose, it uses rout-
ing and signaling protocols to facilitate dynamic service setup, to provide
capacity or to protect services through the use of recovery options on differ-
ent technology layers [23]. The main problem is the compatibility of optical
equipment to support this type of resilience.
The second type of optical resilience is multi-domain. Multi-domain re-
silience is shown in Figure 1.5. Basically each domain is composed by equip-
ment from one optical vendor (Coriant, Huawei, Alcatel..), and that makes
the interoperability between domains a hard task. In this case, the objective
is to provide end-to-end service resilience over multiple network domains (also
called multivendor networks). Here, sharing information between domains is
a critical point.
Figure 1.5: Multi-domain Resilience (from [23])
As can be observed in figure 1.5, each domain has a Original Equipment
Manufacturer (OEM) controller that is used to compute end-to-end paths
by standardized interfaces between layers in a specific domain. The OEM
controller is only able to communicate with NEs in a specific domain. In
order to have resilience in a path from Domain 1 to Domain 3, for instance
it is necessary to introduce a higher controller that has global information
on domains. This is the place where an SDN approach could bring benefits.
With SDN it will be possible to control and manage paths that cross several
domains.
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To manage and control optical paths that traverse several domains, sev-
eral techniques have been proposed: [20], [5], [4]. Basically all these solutions
are based on the use of an hardware abstraction layer. They use this inter-
mediate layer between the NEs and the main controller (SP controller) for
communication via southbound, and in the northbound a standard SDN API
(Restconf, OpenFlow or other) is used to communicate with the main con-
troller (in this case the SP controller). With this approach, a service provider
can manage and control the entire network even though optical equipment
from different providers is used (each optical network vendor will use its
own abstraction layer). In order to make this possible, Service Providers like
China Mobile [29], China Telecom [9], Verizon [10] and industry organizations
like Open Networking Foundation (ONF) [22] have proposed an architecture
where the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) domain controllers will
manage the optical NEs within each vendor’s own domain while providing
open northbound interfaces to a common network orchestrator (a parent “su-
per” controller), as in Figure 1.6. In this figure it can be seen that each optical
network (1,2..n) is managed through the use of a specific OEM controller.
The SP controls the common network orchestrator that is used to manage
and control the whole network. From the SDN point of view, the data plane
is represented by the NEs in the optical network. The main diference here
is the control plane. In this scenario, the control plane is composed by the
OEM controllers and by the common network orchestrator. As such, the
control is split between the SP controller and the OEM controllers. The SP
controller will have the vision and control of the global network throw the use
of OEM controllers. With this approach we achieve control and management
over optical networks in a multi-domain optical SDN environment.
One of the main challenges of these networks is security. In the next
section we will give a security overview of standard SDN and multi-domain
optical SDN networks.
1.2 Security in multi-domain optical SDN en-
vironments
The standard SDN architecture is different from a multi-domain optical SDN
environment architecture in that, the data plane equipment in the latter is
not SDN compatible. As such, different techniques need to be put in place
to secure this new environment.
Several security surveys [24], [1], [3] have given an overview of security in
7
Figure 1.6: Optical network management and control in an SDN environ-
ment.
standard SDN. These surveys are adapted to the case where the equipment’s
in the data plane are compatible with an SDN API. That is not the case
when we have several OEM controllers managing different NEs, with a main
controller orchestrating the network globally. In this case, more layers, inter-
faces (with respect to the OEM controller) appear and the security analysis
became more complex.
Regarding security, standard SDN brings several benefits. The separation
of the control plane and data plane gives SDN an enhancement in security by
means of global network visibility. Any conflicts that appear in the network
can be more easily solved by the logically centralized control plane. However,
this change also brings new security problems. New threats [24], [1] appear
as a result of this separation. This new threats are mainly related to man-
in-the-middle attacks and Denial of service (DoS) attacks.
With the additional division of control brought by using a two-tier hi-
erarchy of SDN controllers, in multi-domain optical networks, new security
problems may arise. For example, a man-in-the-middle attack can be per-
formed to change the information that is sent from the SP controller to the
OEM controller. In this case, the integrity of the request will be at risk. This
problem can be solved with the use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) in the
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communications between these two components. DoS attacks are also possi-
ble. Basically, in this case a DoS attack can be done to the main controller,
to the OEM controllers or to the optical equipment. A DoS attack to any
controller can put the resilience of the entire optical network at risk.
Figure 1.7: Example of a possible attack to the optical network.
If a malicious user intercepts the traffic between the OEM controller and
the common network orchestrator it will be able to make fake requests, and
compromise the network. On the other hand, if the SP controller is compro-
mised, then the entire network is at risk. In this case, a malicious user with
access to the main controller can execute any type of requests to the OEM
controllers and compromise the optical network. This can be seen in Figure
1.7. In this example, the OEM controllers 1 and 2 receive a flood of requests
and execute them in the optical network. This can put the OEM controllers
unavailable to the main controller, causing a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack.
In this situation, the OEM controller will have problems processing normal
requests alarms, traffic problems, and other notifications from the optical
network will be received with a high delay at the SP controller. The worst
case will be the entire unavailability of the OEM controller. Such event can
lead to interruption of services in the optical network as the common network
orchestrator will not see the failures and as such, will not recover the optical
9
services.
The above security challenges are the motivation for this work. In order
to solve the above problems it is important to ensure that all operations
executed in the DP (optical equipment) by the OEM controllers are trusted
(the requests from the common network orchestrator should not be compro-
mised) and will not compromise the optical equipment functions. It should
be also ensured that the OEM controller is always available, independently
of external attacks. This is a challenge, and as such is the main motivation
of this work.
1.3 Goals
The migration of legacy optical transport networks to SDN should be done
without introducing new security problems. The objective of this work is to
identify and solve two particular security problems that can arise from the use
of optical network equipment with OEM controllers in an SDN environment.
First, it should be ensured that the OEM controller is always available,
and capable of processing requests without significant delays. Second, the
integrity of the requests should also be guaranteed.
1.4 Contributions
This work will contribute to improve the security of service provider networks
on the process of migration to SDN. This is achieved by designing and imple-
menting a monitoring mechanism (reverse proxy) with well defined policies
in the OEM controller to prevent DoS attacks. The use of a firewall will also
be included. This solution will help SP, to protect their optical networks and
make them more resilient in multivendor scenarios.
The mechanism developed in this thesis will be included in the Coriant
OEM solutions and documentation, helping our customers, SPs in securing
their infrastructure.
1.5 Document outline
In Chapter 2, we present basic concepts about optical networks. In addition,
we make a review of the literature of security problems that affect SDN
and how they can affect optical SDNs. In Chapter 3, we present the design
and implementation of our security solution. This includes the design of
mechanisms to protect the OEM controller against some DoS attacks and
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man-in-the-middle attacks. In Chapter 4, we evaluate our solution. We end
this thesis in Chapter 5, concluding it and presenting the future work.
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Chapter 2
Context and related work
This chapter will start by giving an overview of optical networks. The goal
is to understand how these networks work, its main challenges and how
SPs typically handle them. This initial part also defines the functional and
non functional requirements of these networks. Then, we present a security
overview for standard SDN networks. This will include security problems,
enhancements and solutions. Finally, we consider the main issues in multi-
domain optical SDN environments.
2.1 Overview of optical networks
Nowadays, SPs use optical networks to deliver all type of services to their cos-
tumers. These networks rely on fibers operated by optical equipment that
include optical interfaces [8]. The SP needs to manage and control these
networks in order to: compute new paths (when needed), identify points of
failures (normally links that need to be repaired or replaced) through alarm
information, analyze performance problems, among many other operations.
The network management operations are divided in four sub-areas [8]: con-
figuration management (install, remove optical equipment and adjust their
settings); connection management (establish cross connections in the equip-
ments to activate end-to-end services in the network); fault management
(alarms on optical equipment to identify signal losses or other problems);
performance management (information about the quality of the services in
all involved optical ports). All this information is used to manage the optical
services that run in the optical network. Typically, the Network Management
Systems Network Management System (NMS) centralizes all the information
(alarms, performance, connections, etc) for each optical service that is run-
ning on the optical network. With this approach, SPs are able to see all
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the optical services to quickly identify problems. Unfortunately, this is not
simple to achieve in multi-domain scenarios. This is a challenge we try to
address with an SDN solution.
The SP also requires optical networks to be resilient [23]. These networks
transport large quantities of information, making survivability a critical fac-
tor. The main goal is to guarantee availability of optical services. As such,
the networks have to be designed to recover optical services automatically
when failures occur. As explained in the previous chapter, resilience can be
divided into multilayer and multi-domain. The focus of this work will be
in multi-domain resilience, since we target the scenario of having an OEM
controller in each domain (see Figure 1.5), with all domains being controller
by a SP controller.
Automatic recovery is very important to guarantee the Service Level
Agreements (SLA) that defines the time the overall optical network can be
down (the availability of the network). Another parameter that has to be
taken into account is service recovery time upon failure (the time spent to
change the optical paths from a path with failures to a new path).
To achieve the desired resilience, a good planing for the network deploy-
ment is required. This includes protection for the optical links in different
locations. In addition, since the SP uses optical equipment from different ven-
dors, it is necessary to protect their optical networks from equipment failures
from every specific vendor. Diversity is key for multi-domain resilience (see
Figure 1.5).
In the next subsection we present the evolution of optical networks. Then,
we define the main operations of optical equipment.
2.1.1 Evolution of optical networks
Optical networks have evolved significantly in the past few years [28]. The
first optical networks used a single wavelength per fiber, and were opaque:
they could only transport one signal in each optical channel. Later, a new
technology was introduced, capable of transporting several signals (frequen-
cies) over a single fiber. This new technology, Wavelength Division Multi-
plexing (WDM), offers large transmission capacities to optical fibers. The
backbone core network (the network that interconnects the metro networks,
see Figure 1.2) is highly based on optical links utilizing the WDM technol-
ogy. More recently this technology has evolved to the Dense Wavelength
Division Multiplexing (DWDM), a scheme that makes better use of spec-
trum to improve the transmission capacities. These networks use predefined
connections between the network nodes and pre-planned add and drop wave-
length channels. To understand how this is all set up, it is important to
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understand optical cards, and its main functions.
2.1.2 Optical equipment overview
In optical networks, network equipment is composed of several cards. The
cards can be divided into filters, amplifiers, transponders and muxponders.
The transponders and muxponders are composed of two sides, the client and
the line side. The client side is where the initial signal is injected. This signal
is then encapsulated in a wavelength to be delivered in optical channel (us-
ing any frequency available). The main difference between the transponder
and the muxponder is in the relation between the client and line side. The
muxponder can aggregate several client signals into one line (see Figure 2.1),
whereas the transponder can only aggregate one. As such, with a muxponder
it is possible to have several low rate signals as clients and multiplex them
into a higher rate in the line, and send it to the optical channel. The line side
of the transponder or muxponder can then be dropped by a filter and then
amplified by an amplifier card (see Figure 2.2). In this figure we show a add
and drop scenario with two degrees. Each degree can be seen as a different
direction for the optical channel. First, the line side of the transponder or
muxponder is connected to the Optical Multiplexer / Demultiplexer (OMD)
(a filter card with the fiber connection to the muxponder or transponder)
and then the signal flows to the amplifier card (Optical Add Drop Multi-
plexer (OADM)). This card connects to a similar card in other location by
using the optical channel (an example would be optical channel connection
between two large cities). All these cards should work together in the same
NE.
Optical networks today have to be dynamic, and can change during both
planning phase or operation phase, due to traffic changes or due to link or
NE failure. To address this issue, Reconfigurable optical add and drop mul-
tiplexing (ROADM) and Wavelength Selective Switching (WSS) technology
was added. The use of a WSS and ROADM can be seen in Figure 2.3. It
allows wavelength reassignment without the need for manual intervention,
but with the tradeoff of higher node complexity and cost. Basically, with
the WSS it is possible to deliver the signal to any available direction in the
NE, and that gives the option to create optical services in any direction. The
configuration is executed by the operator via software, allowing the reconfig-
uration, such as, adding new services or changing existing ones when traffic
demands change.
Another recent improvement in the optical network that help operators
in management and control includes the Flexi-grid. This solution adds more
bandwidth to the optical channels, allowing the transport of more bandwidth
14
Figure 2.1: Muxponder aggregates several client signals into one line side
signal.
Figure 2.2: Add and drop scenario from a transponder or muxponder to a
filter.
in a single optical channel.
Another important technique is the adaptive Rate Modulation, which
allows dynamically varying modulation in an errorless manner in order to
maximize the throughput under momentary propagation conditions. It also
reduces interferences in the network. With this technology, the number of
amplifiers can be reduced, consequently reducing network costs.
The Optical Transport Network (OTN) Switch, allows multiple clients
to be transparently bundled into uniform containers and sent on a single
wavelength. With this technology, clients are decoupled from the transport
15
Figure 2.3: ROAMD scenario with WSS
interface, increasing network efficiency.
The new technologies introduced in the past few years have made opti-
cal networks more flexible, allowing high degree of control in multi-domain
optical environments. As a result, optical networks are changing from static
point-to-point systems to mesh topologies with dynamic and diverse wave-
lengths [28].
2.2 Security overview in Software Defined Net-
working
The main purpose of security is to preserve confidentiality, integrity and
availability of information system resources [27]. Unfortunately, all systems
have vulnerabilities which can be exploited by an attacker with the objec-
tive to subvert the security policies of the system. These vulnerabilities can
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arise from project, implementation, and operation [26]. SDN was not cre-
ated with security as a priority, and that introduce project vulnerabilities
to this paradigm. In addition, the network programability brought up by
SDN brings implementation vulnerabilities (due to bad implementation of
new software). Finally, if the SDN is not correctly operated, operation vul-
nerabilities can also appear.
The objective of this section is to give an overview of security in SDN.
The focus will be: analysis, enhancements, and solutions. This related work
can be used as the basis to improve the security in our scenario, where several
OEM controllers are orchestrated by a main SDN controller.
2.2.1 Security analysis in SDN
In this subsection, we give an overview of SDN security. In the literature
there are some surveys about security in SDN, [24], [1], [3], and [16]. The
security of SDN can be divided into five main components: CP, DP, MP,
and communication between them. These components can be seen in Figure
2.4, enumerated from one to five.
Figure 2.4: Components in SDN.
Several security threats were identified in [16]. First, with forged or faked
traffic flows between the NEs an attacker can make a DoS attack to the net-
work by changing flows in the NEs (component 1 in Figure 2.4). Second,
vulnerabilities in the NEs can be exploited. For instance, the information
retrieved from the NE can be different from the information in the controller.
Third, an attack on control plane communication can be used to make DoS
attacks or for theft information attacks (man-in-the-middle attacks). Fourth,
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attacks to vulnerabilities in the main controller could compromise the whole
network. This is the most severe threat in SDN because the controller cen-
tralizes the knowledge of the network. Fifth, attacks to the administrative
station: these applications are used to access the control plane. If they are
compromised, the controller is also compromised, and the whole network is
at risk. Sixth, lack of information to make forensics analysis: it’s important
to have trusted logs about all the operations in the system. Without them
it will be impossible to understand the cause of problems that may occur in
the network.
To solve the previous problems, the authors of [16] identified the following
mechanisms for protection: replication; diversity; self-healing mechanisms;
dynamic device association; trust between controllers and the NEs; trust
between applications and controllers; security domains; and the use of secure
components.
In [13] the authors follow a different approach for the security analysis, fo-
cusing on OpenFlow, the standard protocol for SDN. They use the STRIDE
method (Spoofing identity; Tampering with data; Repudiation; Information
disclosure; Denial of service; Elevation of privilege) [12] with an attack tree
approach. They were able to identify the following possible attacks: denial of
service against the flow table; hash collision attack on the flow table; observ-
ing differences in controller response times to get information (information
disclosure), and cache poisoning attacks against the flow table or controller
state. In [6], the authors identify new vulnerabilities in OpenFlow that are
related with: man-in-the-middle attacks, switch authentication, slow table
verification and others.
[2] and [7] addressed the DoS problem. The authors identify several DoS
attacks types: Smurf attack, UDP flood attacks, ICMP flood attacks, Syn
flood attacks, Teardrop attacks and land attacks. In SDN these attacks can
be executed to the network; to the main controller; or to the management
Interface.
The smurf attack is a form of DoS attack that can make an entire network
unavailable or inoperable. This type of attack explores vulnerabilities in the
Internet Protocol (IP) and Internet Control Message Protocols (ICMP) . For
this attack, the attacker sends a large amount of ICMP broadcast messages
with a spoofed source address (the victim address). By responding to the
ICMP messages, the victim will leave the network unavailable.
In the UDP flood attack the attacker sends a large volume of UDP packets
to the target system. This will saturate the network, and put legitimate
services unavailable.
The ICMP flood attack, explores the use of echo packets to check if the
remote host is alive. Basically, the agents send a large volume of ICMP
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ECHO REPLY packets to the target victim. The packets request a reply from
the victim and by making the reply, the victim will saturate the bandwidth
of the network connection. This will make the target system unavailable.
In the SYN flood attack the victims are flooded with half open TCP
connections. To establish a TCP connection between a client and a server,
the client sends a SYN to the server, and the server responds with a SYN-
ACK response message to the client. The connection is only finished when
the client responds with the ACK message. Basically, for this attack, the final
ACK message is never sent by the client, and a connection stays half open
between the client and the server. The server saves the connection state in
its structures, but these structures have limited resources. The system may
crash or became unavailable for legitimate users.
In the Tear drop attack, the attacker sends long packets, that have to
be fragmented. In addition, the attacker sends an invalid offset value into
the subsequent fragments. As such, when the packet is reassembled by the
victim, if the operating system is not prepared, the system may crash.
In the land attack, the IP address is modified so that the source and des-
tination IPs are the same. This attack works by making the target machine
reply to itself continuously.
After this brief security analysis, we will investigate which attacks are
valid in a multi-domain optical SDN. This is the topic of the next subsection.
2.2.2 Security analysis in multi-domain optical SDN
To understand the security problems that can affect a multi-domain optical
SDN, first it is necessary to identify the differences to standard SDN. Lets
begin with its components. In Figure 2.5, we identify the potentially vul-
nerable components of a multi-domain optical SDN. In this figure, we can
see more vulnerable components than in standard SDN. This is due to the
addition of OEM controllers between the main controller and the optical
network.
In this work, the objective is the protection of the OEM controller. By
assuming that the optical network is not compromised, the focus will be
the vulnerable components 3 and 4, in Figure 2.5. From [16], an attack
to the communication between the main controller and the OEM controller
(component 4) can be used for theft information or to modify a legitimate
request that will be executed in the network. In this case the integrity of
requests will be broken. Another problem is related to DoS attacks. A DoS
attack can be executed against the OEM controller (component 3). All the
DoS attacks described in the previous subsection will be possible here.
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Figure 2.5: Components in multi-domain optical SDN.
In the next subsection we present enhancements and solutions to protect
the system from this type of attacks.
2.2.3 Enhancements and security solutions
The problems described in the previous sections (both for standard SDN and
for multi-domain optical SDN) can be mitigated through the use of existing
security solutions tailored to these settings.
For the DoS attacks several defense mechanisms have been proposed in
the literature [2], [7] but, depending on the specific attack, the defense mech-
anisms may need to be adapted.
To better protect the resources from a DoS attack, it is important to
understand what are the main incentives for the attacker. In [30], the authors
divide the motivation of the attackers into five main categories:
• Financial/economical gain: in this case attacker has a financial gain
as the objective. Normally this type of attacks is the most dangerous,
and hard to stop. An example for an attack with this objective is sim-
ple: imagine that the SP sells to clients a high SLA. In this case, if the
optical services stop working for a long time, the client will complain,
and the SP may have to pay. In this scenario, the attacker could be a
client that wants to receive an indemnity for breaching of the SLA.
• Revenge:, in this type of attack, the attacker wants revenge for some-
thing that happened. Normally, the attackers have small technical
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skills. This type of attacks represents a small threat to the SP.
• Ideological belief: In this type of attacks, the attackers are motivated
by their ideological beliefs. Some of the attacks can be politically mo-
tivated.
• Intellectual Challenge: In this type of attacks, the attackers enjoy
to experiment and learn how to launch attacks.
• Cyberwarfare: In this scenario, the attackers are working for a mil-
itary or terrorist organization, and they may want to attack critical
sections of another country. In this scenario, the target will be the
telecommunication network of a country, that is highly dependent of
the optical network.
After presenting the main motivations to execute a DoS attack it is im-
portant to protect the OEM controller, to guarantee the availability of the
optical network. In [31], the authors describe a new algorithm that is inspired
in biological systems to implement an Evolving Defence Mechanism (EDM).
This algorithm hides network information by implementing a mechanism in
the controller that makes: variation of IP addresses; variation of routes; vari-
ation of host responses; variation of encryption methods and variation of
authentication approaches. By using random network configurations, it is
possible to detect on-going attacks and change the network configurations
to eliminate security threats according to the security requirements defined
for the system. This algorithm can protect the system against several attack
types. An example is DoS attacks. When a DoS attack is detected, a vari-
ation of the IP address will invalidate the attack (since the IP used for the
attack ceases to be valid).
In [30] and [18], the authors describe some generic defense mechanisms
that can be used for DoS protection. In [18], the authors divide the defense
mechanisms in preventive and reactive.
The preventive option has the objective of preventing the attack. The
authors divide prevention mechanisms into two groups: Attack prevention
and DoS prevention.
Attack prevention uses system security mechanisms and protocol security
mechanisms. This can be done, for example, through the use of a firewall.
When the firewall detects abnormal traffic, for example a SYN flood attack,
the policies defined will block the attack.
The DoS prevention solution, is divided in resource accounting and re-
source multiplication. In this case, the objective is to have enough resources
to enable the victim to endure attack attempts without causing denial the
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service to legitimate users. The prevention of a DoS attack is hard, because
the attacker can use large scale bot nets to execute the attack, the resources
of the victim may not be enough to protect the system.
Another defense mechanism is the reactive approach. The objective of
this mechanism is to alleviate the impact of an attack to the victim system.
The strategy is to deploy ways to detect attacks through the analysis of re-
source usage and behavior of the system. In this case, after an attack pattern
is detected, the system will react and alleviate the attack. The attacks can be
detected through the use of several mechanisms: pattern detection, anomaly
detection, or third party detection. With pattern detection, specific attack
behaviors are stored in a database. When an attack corresponds to a pattern
in the database, the system will react to mitigate it. In the anomaly detec-
tion mechanism, the states of the system are periodically compared in order
to detect anomalies. The anomaly detection can be standard or trained.
The standard operation uses specifications of normal behavior and is based
on protocol standards or in sets of rules. In the trained specifications, the
normal behavior is specified with thresholds for different parameters. In this
case all communication that exceed one or more of these values are consid-
ered anomalous. In third party detection, the detection is based on external
messages that signals the occurrence of an attack and provide attack char-
acterization.
After the attack is detected, a response strategy to the attack is nec-
essary. To respond to these attacks, the authors of [18] classify reactive
mechanisms as agent identification, rate-limiting, filtering and reconfigura-
tion. Agent identification provides information about the machines that are
executing the attack. This information will be used to alleviate the impact of
the attack. Rate limit imposes a limit on a set of packets that are considered
malicious. This type of defense may cause false positives. In filtering mech-
anisms, after the attack is detected, all the attack stream is filtered. Finally,
in a reconfiguration mechanism the topology of the system is reconfigured
with either more resources, or the isolation of the attack machines.
The previous mechanisms, together, can represent a good defense to DoS
attacks.
2.3 Summary
In this chapter, optical network security problems in SDN were identified,
and a number of solutions were presented. This information is the basis for
the design of our solution to protect the OEM controller against DoS attacks.
That is the topic presented in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
Nowadays, telecommunication systems are critical infrastructures, that have
to work 24/7 with little (or no) downtime. Optical network failures, in par-
ticular, presents a high cost for the operators (and for society), as a single
optical link failure can disrupt an enormous amount of user connections . As
such, one of the key requirements of optical networks is availability. Opti-
cal networks have to be designed with protection mechanisms that allow the
recovery of systems after a failure, in a matter of seconds. In multi-domain
scenarios, it is very important to synchronize information between network
domains, in order to guarantee overall optical network availability. In this
scenario, the OEM controller is responsible to abstract the optical network
information between the SP controller and the optical equipment. As a con-
sequence, the availability of the OEM controller is a critical point. In this
work we have shown that the protection of the OEM controller against DoS
attacks is possible.
Our solution to mitigate DoS attacks is composed of two techniques: re-
verse proxy and firewall. The reverse proxy is used to control the traffic
flow in the OEM controller, and the firewall is used to protect the system
against some known (D)DoS attacks. The evaluation show that both ap-
proaches together represent a good defense agains (D)DoS attacks, and as
such guarantee availability. The use of secure communications between the
OEM controller and the SP controller is important to protect the integrity
of the requests.
Our proposed solution is now being deployed with the installation of
Coriant OEM controller. The techniques defined in this work should be
added to Nginx configuration, and the documentation be updated with an
explanation of the new functionalities. The firewall rules will also be added
to the documentation (hardening manual) of the OEM controller. With this
work we increase the trust of our system to the SP equipment, influencing
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decision makings when choosing SDN products.
5.1 Future Work
For future work, we plan to propose an analysis of a particular type of re-
quests (as these can be malicious) executed be the SP controller. If a mali-
cious user executes malicious operations in the OEM controller, these opera-
tions can weaken the optical network (by deleting services for example). As
such, if the OEM controller identify that the request is malicious, the request
should not be executed in the optical network.
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